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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL and CLARK JENKINS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
)

PETITION FOR REHEARING^

vs
)
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent

Case No. 19186

)

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Defendant-Respondent petitions the
Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled

matter. In its

decision, filed 'July 23, 1986, [hereinafter referred to as Call
III] , the Court erred in the following particulars:
1.

The decision creates new rules concerning the

"law of the case", the practical effect of which will
"logjam" both trial and appellate courts.
2.

The decision deprives the Defendant-Respondent of

an opportunity to present its full case in

"defense"

of the validity of its Ordinance and the impact fee
assessed thereunder.
3.

The decision improperly adjudicates the validity

of the Ordinance BEFORE the defendant was allowed to
present its side of the case.
4.

The decision authorizes the Plaintiff to assert

new

claims, while

opportunity

denying

to

the Defendant

the

to assert the appropriate "defenses"

against those claims.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts are contained in the original Brief of
Respondent. The trial court's Finding of Fact are included as an
appendix to the original Brief of Respondent.

ARGUMENT
I
THE DECISION DNINTENDEDLY ABOLISHES
THE "LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE
BY ALLOWING TO BE RAISED
CLAIMS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED EARLIER
AND WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED BY THE
COURTfS PREVIOUS DECISIONS
This action
as originally filed in 1978
alleged the
invalidity and unconstitutionality of the West Jordan flood
control and
Ordinance"].

parks

impact

fee ordinance

This Court originally

[hereinafter

"the

decided the Plaintiffs'

claims adversely to Plaintiffs by holding that the Ordinance was
facially "constitutional" and "valid".

Call vs City of West

Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) [hereinafter Call I ] .
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs applied for a rehearing.

They

asserted that the impact fee ordinance was unconstitutional "as
applied". 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980) [hereinafter Call II]. This
Court stated:
While we agree that the ordinance is not
constitutional on its face, plaintiffs raise question
as to its constitutionality as applied to them which
make disposition of this issue as a matter of law
inappropriate.
614 P.2d at 1258. Emphasis added. This Court concluded:
In this case the rule adopted by this Court in
Call I, quoted ante, cannot be applied without
plaintiffs being given the opportunity to present
evidence to show that the dedication required of them
had no reasonable relationship to the needs for flood
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
control Digitized
or parks
and
recreation
facilities
created by
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the requirement that if the subdivision generates such
needs and West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of
dedication, it is only fair that the fee so collected
be used in such a way as to benefit demonstrably the
subdivision in question. This is not to say that the
benefit must be solely to the particular subdivision,
but only that there be some demonstrable benefit to
it.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. No costs awarded.
614 P.2d at 1259. Emphasis added.
This Court could have been not more clear as to the limited
issues to be considered in

further proceedings.

One year later

in Banberry Development Corporation vs City of South Jordan, 631
P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), this Court wrote:
In Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P.2d
217 (1979), opinion on rehearing, 614 P.2d (1980),
this Court upheld the validity of a city ordinance
that required subdividers, as a condition of plat
approval, to dedicate certain proposed subdivision
land to the city (or pay cash in lieu) for flood
control and/or park and recreation facilities. In
remanding the case for trial on the constitutionality
of the ordinance as applied (i.e., the requirement
that seven percent of the subdivision land be
dedicated), this Court ruled that "the dedication
should have some reasonable relationship to the need
created by the subdivision."
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added.
In

March

1981

the

Plaintiffs

moved

to

amend

their

complaint. The Defendant, asserting that the issues remaining in
this case were limited to the "reasonableness" of the impact
fee, vigoriously opposed the amendment. Defendant's "Answer" (to
the amended complaint) states:
Defendant asserts the material issues covered the
allegations contained in paragraph 29 through 48 have
already been decided adversely to the Plaintiff in the
Memorandum Decision of the District Court on May 21
1978, and in the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court
(filed December 26, 1979, petition for rehearing, June
27, 1980). The inclusion of said allegations and the
attendant expansion of Plaintiff's alleged claims
Digitized bythe
the Howard
W. Hunterof
Law Library,
Clark Law School,
BYU. limiting the
violate
Order
theJ. Reuben
Supreme
Court
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issues to be presented at trial.

Paragraph 8.
Notwithstanding these objectionsf the amendment was granted
by Judge Sawaya of the District Court, However, when the case
was finally tried before Judge Dee of the District Court,

the-

Plaintiffs presented no evidence on any of the expanded issues.
At the conclusion of the presentation the Plaintiffs1 evidence
AND BEFORE THE CITY PRESENTED ITS CASE IN CHIEF,

Judge Dee

correctly ruled that the Plaintiffs had failed in their burden
of proof. Judge Dee specifically found no "unreasonableness" in
the impact fee.
Now, some eight years after the litigation was filed, this
Court has ruled that the Plaintiff can expand the issues.

The

Court now writes:
Although West Jordan does not cross-appeal the
allowance of the amendment, it urges this Court to
limit the case to the constitutional "reasonableness"
issue. However, the pleadings may be amended after
remand within the sound discretion of the trial court
so long as they do not cover issues specifically
foreclosed by the appellate court.
The foregoing statements (from Call II and Banberry)

as to the

limited issues on remand clearly indicate that "reasonableness"
issue was THE SOLE ISSUE to be decided. The nature of the
original action (declaratory judgment concerning the validity of
the ordinance) and the Supreme Court's approval of the facial
validity of that ordinance should have "foreclosed" all issues
other than the "reasonableness" of the impact fee

at least for

this case filed by these Plaintiffs. THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO TAKE SUCCESSIVE "BITES AT THE APPLE".
There was no need for the City to cross-appeal.

Judge

Sawaya's ruling allowing the amended complaint was not a final
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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impact a c c r u i n g t o t h e C i t y ,

a s J u d g e Dee had s p e c i f i c a l l y

t h a t t h e C i t y had h e l d a p u b l i c h e a r i n g
law.

This s p e c i f i c

concerning t h i s

"new"

The d o c t r i n e
Court's decision

of

CLAIMED

with

the

r e n d e r e d moot any a p p e a l by t h e

City

claim.
"the

in t h i s

WHAT ATTORNEY
HIS

finding

in compliance

found

law of

the

c a s e " ought to l i m i t

regard.

ESPECIALLY AN ATTORNEY

INVALIDITY

the

WHO JUST "LOST" ON

OF AN ORDINANCE

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION

IN

AN APPEAL

OF A

WOULDN'T LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO

"POLISH" HIS PLEADINGS A LITTLE BY ADDING NEW CAUSES OF ACTION?
Rather than rewarding slopping pleadings
of

claims,

-especially

this

Court

should

in " d e c l a r a t o r y

and t h e

encourage

judgment

"reservation"

judicial

where t h e

facts

r e a l l y a r e n o t i n d i s p u t e and w h e r e , a s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e

matter

( t h e v a l i d i t y of AN o r d i n a n c e )
judgment

stage!

The

Court

Plaintiffs'

should

initial

be

actions"

economy—

can be a d j u d i c a t e d

concerned

by

the

c l a i m s were t o t h e e f f e c t

fact

that

ENABLING LEGISLATION a u t h o r i z i n g

the Ordinance.

C a u s e of

complaint.]1

Action

Plaintiffs

lost

of

the original

in Supreme C o u r t

t h e r e WAS

ENABLING LEGISLATION,

follow the

statute.

in C a l l

but

that

at the

I,

summary

that

there

the

was NO

[See t h e

First

Now, AFTER t h e
they

claim

West J o r d a n

that

didn't

P l a i n t i f f s ' o r i g i n a l claims t h a t t h e ordinance was an invalid "tax" for
which t h e r e was no enabling l e g i s l a t i o n [Third Cause of Action] and t h a t
t h e dedication Digitized
of land
money
required
by theor
Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,under
J. Reubenthe
Clark Ordinance
Law School, BYU.c o n s t i t u t e d an
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l "taking Machine-generated
of property
without
j u s t compensation" [Second
OCR,
may contain errors.

The broad

language of Call III invites attorneys and

subordinate courts to continue to "hold"

causes of action "in

reserve", rather than pleading everything. Such an approach to
our legal system is wasteful, is contrary to the "spirit" of
modern

jurisprudence

and

contradicts

the

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.
Rather than limiting the issues to be decided, Call III has
now expanded the issues.

This is particularly aggravating since

the claim was originally filed as a "declaratory judgment"
claim. The Plaintiff should put in their case

ALL OF THEIR

CLAIMS as to the invalidity of an ordinance. The decision in
Call III rewards the Plaintiffs for sloppy pleading and allows
them to take "successive bites at the apple" after their appeal
is decided adversely to them in the first instance.
The Court's decision in Call III says to attorneys and to
subordinate judges: "It doesn't, matter what the Supreme Court
says. Our decisions mean nothing and the factors limiting the
case and the decision are not to be honored."

The Supreme Court

ought to say what it means and mean what it says. Certainly the
Court cannot expect subordinate judges and attorneys to honor
and

follow

its

rulings

[i.e.

"remanded

for

trial

on

a

'constitutionality as applied' issue with "reasonableness" (of
the impact fee) the dispositive factor] if it fails to do so.
Call III, as presently written, constitutes authority to ignore
the

Court's

rulings

and

encourages

attorneys

to

file

half-hearted pleadings, "holding back" on "sleeper" causes of
action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II
THE COURTS PRESENT ADJUDICATION ON THE
MERITS OF THE ORDINANCE IS PREMATURE
AND UNFAIR TO THE DEFENDANT, WHICH HAS
BEEN DEPRIVED OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
ITS DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS
At the conclusion of the presentation
case-in-chief, Judge Dee of the district

court

of Plaintiffs1
ruled that the

Plaintiffs failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence that
the impact fee assessed against them was "unreasonable". The
DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PRESENT ITS "CASE-IN-CHIEF" TO
DEFEND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS1 ALLEGATIONS. This ruling precluded
the Defendants from an opportunity to present its full defense.
The testimony presented by the Defendant concerning the
public hearing

was merely

in compliance with the Court's

pre-trial order. That evidence was not necessarily a complete
presentation

of

the

Defendant's

case.

Judge

Dee

ruled

repeatedly that the Defendant had complied with the pre-trial
order.

The trial court is in a much better advantage to the

position to determine the compliance with the court order yet
this Court rules on the basis. Nevertheless, the Court now holds
"as a matter of law", that the City failed to comply with the
district court's pre-trial order.
It is patently unfair to decide at this level and at this
late stage in the litigation to hold

that the City has f as

"a

matter of law", failed to sustain the burdens imposed upon it by
the district
repeatedly

court's pre-trial

ruled

that

order. The district

the City we had

complied

court

with

pre-trial order. Judge Dee stated:
. . . I have already ruled on the question whether I
thoughtDigitized
he's
complied with Judge Rigtrup's order, and
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
I think he has, Machine-generated
. ..
OCR, may contain errors.

its

Record at 1711-1712. Emphasis added.
To hold

on the basis of the limited evidence presented

merely

in

compliance

with

the

trial

court's

order

that the Ordinance is invalid, is unfair.

pre-trial
The City-

should have the opportunity to make a complete showing as to the
holding of the public hearing.
In Call III the Court now writes:
Although the statute does not specifically address the
required notice, we hold that the because the statute
calls
for
a public
hearing
our
legislature
contemplated something more than a regular city
council meeting held, so far as the record here
discloses, without specific advance notice to the
public that the proposed
ordinance would be
considered. Notice, to be effective, must alert the
public to the nature and scope of the ordinance that
is finally adopted. . . .
Citations to cases omitted.
statute does

The Court correctly notes that the

not specifically address any required notice.

However, the Court indicates that the public was not put on
notice that the ordinance would not be adopted.

This is

incorrect.
The record

on the basis of the limited evidence

does

show that prior to the adoption of the impact fee ordinance in
1975 the public was notified. [Because of the trial court's
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims, the Defendant was not required
to present any evidence as to the meeting at which the ordinance
was actually adopted.]

Because the City only presented a

limited amount of evidence in compliance with the district
court's pre-trial order, there was no necessity to provide the
agenda for the January 1975 City Council meeting.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Furthermore,

even if there was an advance public notice, the agenda may long
have been destroyed. [This particular item is significant, as
discussed in the issues outlined in Point III.D below.]
The Court notes that there is no statutory requirement of ^
advance notice but nevertheless holds that the "statute calls
for

a public

hearing"

and

implies

that

the

"legislature

contemplated something more than a regular city council meeting"
be

held. Thisf however, does not give any guidance as to what

is specifically required.

Is advance public notice of the

public hearing required? If so,

why did not Legislature say so?

Certainly this fact must be contrasted with the public notice
requirements contained in other statutes. See, for example,
§10-9-5: fifteen days advance notice and publication in a
newspaper

required for zoning ordinance amendments; §10-2-414:

twenty days advance notice and publication in a newspaper
required before annexations can be effected, 10-2-414, Utah
Code. Section 11-23-7 requires a "public hearing" before a
special service district can be created, but Section 11-23-8
requires extensive publication of notice in a newspaper.
Admittedly, the Legislature may have intended to required
"more than a regular city council meeting." But in Section
10-9-25, the Leqislature obviously did not necessary intend that
"published notice" be required. Had the Legislature intended as
much, it could have easily said so

as it did in these other

provisions. The Legislature didn't say so, so it must have
intended that there could be LESS (than "published notice").
Thus, if the Court is expecting the City to come forth with a
"proof of publicication" affidavit, that is a requirement not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

necessarily contemplated by the statute.

Furthermore, the Court's ruling ignores the evidence.
First, there was direct testimony by Glen Moosman
councilman who ATTENDED THE MEETING

a city

that a "public hearing"

was held. [This must be contrasted with the total absence of
evidence to the contrary.] Secondly, the hearing was held in the
auditorium of a local school

NOT THE CITY COUNCILfS CHAMBERS,

which would be the regular place of meeting. Thirdly, there must
have been some kind of "notice" given, so as to alert people to
the meeting
citizens

if only as to the change of location. Fourthly,
including Developers

appeared

at the hearing.

Fifthly, those in attendance were given the opportunity to
speak: a public "hearing"! And lastly, the Ordinance was not
adopted

until

a

considerable

time

later. Obviously,

the

Ordinance was not "hustled through" the legislative process
without the opportunity for public input.
Of particular concern for the Court should be the fact that
the Plaintiffs themselves have NOT claimed they were deprived of
an opportunity for public input

arguably granted by §10-9-2 5.

The Plaintiffs' land wasn't even within the city limits at the
time.
If the Court is inclined to state that the Legislature
"contemplated

something

more

than

a regular

city

j

council

meeting, the Court should say what that specific requirement is.
As the Court correctly notes, the record does not disclose that
advance notice was given. This is because the City
of the trial court's ruling

)

by reason

was not able to present its

complete case in defense case-in-chief.

This Court should

remand the case for the presentation for such evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Furthermore, the Court's present decision ignores the
evidence that the Planning and Zoning Commission had required
the "dedication" of land (parks and open space) as a condition
of development approval beginning in early

1974. When the -

legality of such was questioned, an ordinance was prepared and
the matter was referred to the City Council. The

"public

hearing" was held in August 1974. The ordinance was finally
adopted in January 1975.
This

is not

the

case where

the City

"quickie" and without notice to anyone

Council---as a

decides to adopt an

ordinance. The public did have an opportunity for input! On
several occasions.
What is particularly aggravating in the case at bar is that
this case is not presented as one where THESE DEVELOPERS are
claiming they were deprived of the opportunity for input into
the decision on the impact fee. These developers weren't even
around

at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. The

property they developed was not even within the city limits at
the time of the adoption of the ordinance. [The territory for
the Wescall subdivision was annexed in early 1977

two years

AFTER the adoption of the impact fee ordinance.]
The Plaintiffs

should

be

estopped

from

asserting

an

invalidity to this ordinance. They have never made any claim
whatsoever that they were personally deprived in any fashion
from giving the West Jordan City Council any input.
Ill
THE COURT'S EXPANSION OF THE ISSUES
BEYOND THE "REASONABLENESS" OF THE IMPACT FEE ISSUE
JUSTIFIES
THE
DEFENDANT
ASSERT
ADDITIONAL
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter LawTO
Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU. DEFENSES
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
ABOVE THE MERE
REASONABLENESS
OF THE IMPACT FEE

If the Court allows the expansion of issues to invalidate
the ordinance beyond a "reasonableness" issue, the Court should
likewise allow the Plaintiffs to "amend" its answer to include
defenses which would address defenses to the Plaintiffs1 claims
going beyond the "reasonableness" issue.
A. The "estoppel" defense.
The Plaintiffs
invalidity

of

the

should

be estopped

ordinance

for

from asserting

anything

other

the
than

"unreasonableness". The estoppel arises by reason of the fact
that the Plaintiffs at the time the ordinance was adopted

owned

land (if they owned it at all at the time) outside of the city
limits 1 Because they needed to come to the City to obtain
municipal services for the subdivision they were intending to
build and to make their development profitable and sellable,
they petitioned for annexation. Following the annexation into
the City, they obtained development approval and paid the impact
fee. [It is questionable whether the fee was at that time even
paid "under protest".

The "protest" did not come until after

the development had been approved, the fee paid and work begun.]
The Plaintiffs built the subdivision and created the impact
(concerning parks and recreation areas and flood-control which
the Planning and Zoning Commission generally found, the City
Council found, which this Court recognized in its decision in
Call I and which THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND! Thereafter
the lawsuit was filed. The Plaintiffs lost on the merits as to
the constitutionality and invalidity of the ordinance. Call I.
Then, FOUR YEARS LATER and some six years after the ordinance is
passed, they
for

claim that the ordinance is invalid. Petitioning

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and obtaining the services and the benefits of being in the
municipality certainly ought to bar the Plaintiffs at this late
stage of the game FROM raising the issue of non-compliance with
the statute.
If they had filed the lawsuit BEFORE they had built the
subdivision, BEFORE they had paid the fee, BEFORE they had
created the impact, declaratory judgment in their favor may be
appropriate. But to create the impact and then ask to get the
money back under the basis that the ordinance was void ab initio
is patently unfair. They ought to be estopped. Certainly the
petition for annexation ought to be an implicit agreement to
abide by the "rules of the game" to which they (through the
annexation) have invited themselves

rather than challenging

the rules after the "game" is over.
B. The "unjust enrichment" defense.
The Plaintiffs created the impact the fee was designed to
address. That impact was determined and found by the trial
court. To have the Plaintiffs have an economic benefit of
development and to not required to install the flood-control and
parks facilities which they would have had to install but for
which they paid the fee, would constitute an unjust enrichment.
Surely the Court ought to remand the case for the adjudication
of this issue and an opportunity for the Defendants to present
its case on this issue.
C. The "mistake" defense.
A similar "defense" arises in that if the City would have
known the ordinance was "void ab initio" (as now declared by the
Court), the City would not have allowed the Developers to create
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the impact thev created: the developers themselves would have

had

to

install

the

parks

and

flood-control

facilities.

Obviously, a "mistake" was made by the City (in assuming the
validity of the ordinance). Certainly, the developers should be
estopped from recovery, which would be an unjust enrichment, by -*
reason of this mistake.
D. Statute of limitation defenses.
The allowance of the filing (in 1981-—SIX YEARS after the
adoption of the Ordinance and almost FOUR years after the
litigation was originally filed) of "new" claims (unrelated to
the claims originally pleaded and decided by this Court in Call
I and other than the "reasonableness" issue) raises "statute of
limitation" defenses, which the City should now be allowed to

;

present.

CONCLUSION

j

The Court should reconsider its decision and limit its
review to the issue of "reasonableness", as determined by the
Call

II

decision.

"reasonableness"

The

of

trial

the

court's

impact

fee

finding

assessed

as

to

the

against

the

I

Plaintiffs should be upheld. Judge Dee correctly applied the
law

as established by this Court in Call II

decision should be upheld.

to the case; his

I

The judgment entered against the

Plaintiffs by reason of their

failure of proof should be

reinstated.

'

If the Court is still inclined to now allow the Plaintiff
to

pursue

legal

(reasonableness)"

theories
theory

beyond

[hastily

the

adopted

"as
only
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applied
after

the

'

Plaintiffs had lost in Call I] , the Court should allow the
Defendant an opportunity to present the appropriate "defenses"
to those newly-allowed claims.
The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims at the
conclusion of the presentation of Plaintiffs' evidence deprived
the Defendant of the opportunity to present its "defense".
Before the Court can rule on the validity of the ordinance in
its

entirety,

all

the

evidence

including

the

complete

"defense" evidence, not merely evidence to comply with the trial
court's pre-trial order

should be heard. Unless the trial

court's judgment is affirmed, the case should be remanded to the
trial court to give the Defendant an opportunity to present its
"case in chief".
The undersigned certifies that this Petition for Rehearing
is presented in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of August, 1986.

^

STEPHEN G^HOMER
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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